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Anti-Terrorism Legislation: A Constitutional Problem
Justin jo1y'
Has side-strpping the Constitution made our nation mm·e secure? The new
anti-terro1-ism legislation has done little to ensure national security and much
to compromise our nation's standards.

fter the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and attacks of I I September 2001 the necessity of dealing with the issue of terrorism dramatically shifted in the national agenda. Prior ro these
events, the war on terrorism had taken a back seat to domestic issues such as health care, education, and the economy. Oklahoma
City magnified the importance of fighting terrorism, but September I I solidified the war on terrorism as item number one on the
agenda. Both Oklahoma City and September n encou raged new
legislation to help federal agencies fight terrorism. The knee-jerk
reaction of the legisLative and executive branches on both occasions
was ro give federal agencies more power and streamline law enforcement and intelligence procedures. After the anti-terrorism
legislation was passed, many difficult cases surfaced , questioning
the constitutionality of federal agencies' actions authorized under
the new legislation. These cases serve as glaring examples of the inconsistency between the recent anti-terrorism legislation and the
Constitution. The inconsistency is, in our desire to find justice and
securi ty we may be sacrificing our own constitutional rights. Has
sidestepping the Constitution made our nation more secure? The
new anti-terrorism legislation has done little to ensure national
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security and much to compromise our nation's standards. This
paper will identify the issues of this growing constitutional problem
and recommend a possible solution by recounting the historical
events that preceded the anti-terrorism legislation; summarizing the
new legislation enacted and the changes it produced in American
law; referring to cases that exemplify the inconsistency between
anti-terrorism legislation and the Constitution; and proposing chat
the solution to fighting terrorism is not found by compromising our
nation's standards, bur by improving our nation's efforts.
THE HISTORY OF ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION

Over the last forty years, the United States has become a prime
target for terrorism and numerous terrorist groups have attacked the
United Stares. Among the terrorist attacks, three motivated a legislative response by the United States. In 1983, 243 U.S. servicemen
were killed in the bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut. After the
attack, Congress passed a "long arm" statute that makes it a crime
to threaten, detain, seize, injure, or kill an American citizen abroad.
This was the first time that a terrorist attack inspired legislation,
bur it would nor be the last.
Before rhe 1990s, terrorist attacks generally occurred overseas,
where the threat of terror seemed distant to Americans. On 19 April
1995 when a truck full of explosives destroyed the Oklahoma City
Federal Building, the threat of terror no longer seemed distant or
untbreatening. After the Oklahoma City bombing, American citizens and politicians were moved to combat the threat of terrorism
through drastic legislation. Immediately following this attack,
Presidenr Clinton signed a controversial statute called the "AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996" (AED PA).' T he
opening line of AEDPA stares, "An Act to deter terrorism, provide
justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for
'"The 'Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,' as passed by the Congress
and signed by President Clinton on April2.4, 1996," <hnp://www.cdr.org/policy/cerrorism/>,
3 April2003.
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other purposes. " 1 This allows the government to freeze the assets of
any organization that the secretary of state designates as terrorist.
"This law bars giving almost anything-money, lodging, training,
and 'personnel' - t o anybody designated as terrorist by the U.S. secretary of state.") This law also restricts the right for prisoners' opportunities for federal review of Lheir convictions or conditions of
their detention. Additionally, this law rigidly restricts federal
habeas corpus petitions. Furthermore, Clinton signed the "Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996"
(IIRIRA) which "provided for automatic deportation for longtime
residents who had been convicted of crimes, even if the conviction
was long ago. " 4
Five years after AEDPA and IIRIRA were passed, Americans
would see the threat of terrorism become unimaginably magnified.
On II September 2001, when every American sat glued to CNN,
watching planes crash into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon, fear and insecurity flooded every heart. Over 3,000 dead and
thousands more injured-this was doubtless the most terrible terrorist attack of modern history. While issues such as the economy,
health care, and education had previously occupied the front pages,
suddenly there was a dramatic shift in agenda. The president was
no longer promising jobs and education, but national security and
justice. A change was necessary. It was tragically obvious that the
current system was incapable of preventing the threat that lay hidden within our own borders. A new Office of Homeland Securiry
was created, more men were employed to hunt down terrorist networks, and new legislation was enacted. On 26 October 2001 the
USA Patriot Act of 2001 was overwhelmingly passed by Congress
and signed into law by Presiden t George W. Bush.s
'Pub/it Law, 104- 32.
' Seth Rosenfeld, "Prosecutors pull out all stops to indict the 6; Ami-terrorism laws, Civil
war-era statute used," San Francisco Chronicle, 5 October 2002, sec. A, 13.
'T.1m:1r Lewin, "Curbs in Immigrants' and Inmates' Rights, Too," New York Time.!, 2.6 December 2000, sec. A. 25.
' Yonah Alexander, ed., U.S. Federal Legal RtSponses ro Terrorism (New York: Transnational
Publishers, 2002), x:x.Ui-xxvi
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The USA Patriot Act is the latest seep in a continuing legislative
trend to provide federal law enforcement agencies with new tools to
fight terrorism. The opening line of the USA Patriot Act reads, "An
Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in rhe United Stares and
around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory cools,
and for ocher purposes. "6 This law was seen as an expansion of
AEOPA by granting federal authorities expanded surveillance and
intelligence powers:
The Act dramatically expands the authority of federal agencies to
conduct wiretapping and other electronic surveillance while simultaneously curtailing judicial oversight. Additionally, the Act
augments and increases the authority of the Attorney General to
detain and deporr non-citizens who are certified as a danger to national security or who belong to certified terrorist organizations,
with only minimal provision for judicia l review/

These newly passed laws are an expression of the government's commitment to providing national security as its top priority. "The government just can't afford to let crime on the scale [committed by]
AI Qaeda to ever happen again."•
THE CoNTROVERSY

The drive to prevent future terror attacks inspired legislators to
pass rhe new anti-terrorism legislation. Yet, most legislators would
concede that new legislation is almost always accompanied by unforeseeable consequences. By granting new powers and freedoms to federal
law enforcement agencies, che legislation has severely restricted che
civil liberties of the people and che authority of che judicial branch.

• Public lAw, 107-56.
' Jennifer CoUins, "And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Informacion with the Intelligence Community under the USA Patriot Act," Ammcan CriminaL lAw
Review 39 (2.002.): 1267.
' Tatsha Robinson, "Fighting Terror/Domestic Security Buffulo Case; Judge Questions
Whether VISit to Afghan Camp Broke Law," Boston Globe, 22 September 2.002, sec. A, 2.5.
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The legislation finds itself challenging the time-honored principles
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, and
habeas jurisdiction of the judicial branch. Several cases have been
brought before the courts that reveal the legal controversy between
anti-terrorism legislation and the procedural safeguards the Constitution ensures. The Fourth Amendment protects people by requiring that the government receive authorization from the appropriate judiciary before it can perform a search and seizure. The
USA Patriot Act allows "enhanced surveillance procedures," and
there is a provision allowing considerable delay in the notice of the
execution of a warrant for search and seizure. 9 This provision has
resulted in judicially unauthorized raids on the homes of Muslim
U .S. citizens, where government agents have broken through
doors, claiming to have knocked, and conducted searches without
producing warrants. 10
The Fifth Amendment states, "No person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 11 There is a
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act that countenances the use of confidential information. Subchapter V of the
INA establishes special procedures that govern the treatment of
purported "alien terrorists." 12 According to that subchapter, the INS
is authorized to present to immigration judges "any evidence for
which the Attorney General determines that public disclosure
would pose a risk to the national security of the United States or to
the security of any individual because it would disclose classified information."13 In the case of Hany Mahmoud Kiareldeen v. Reno and
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the District Court ruled
that INS use of secretive evidence violated the petitioner's Fifth
'USA Patriot Act, sec. 201- 25; provision 213.
••Scott Alexander, "Inalienable Rights?: Muslims in the U.S. since September nth," ]ourmzl of IslAmic Law and Culture 7 (2002): u6-17. In Alexander's article, he notes that such a
search happened to the l~ders of the International Institute for Islamic Thought (lilT) and
their families in Herndon, Virginia, in March of 2002.
11
U.S. Constitution, amend. 5·
"8 U.S. C. 1531 et seq.
u 8 U.S. C. 1534(e)(3)(A).
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Amendment rights, even though they were authorized under federal
statute. 14 On 15 November, 2000 , another petition was granted by a
district court where an alleged terrorist organization was designated as
terrorist in compliance with the AEOPA starute; yet, the Court ruled
that the designation violated the petitioners' Fifth Amendment rights
of due process.'s
Another constitutional issue raised by the ami-terrorism legislation is that of habeas jurisdiction of federal courts. The privilege of
habeas corpus protects against wrongful incarceration by ensuring that
the terms of one's detention will be subject to judicial review. The
Suspension Clause of the Constitution ensures that habeas corpus
will nor be suspended except in case of rebellion or invasion. The
anti-terrorism statures of AEDPA and IIRIRA contain provisions
rhat state, "Except as provided in thi.s section and notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision
or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chaprer."16 In Kiareldeen v. Reno, the petitioners eire Sandoval v. Reno, a case
in which the Court decided that these statures did nor expressly refer to
the court's jurisdiction; therefore, they concluded that the court's jurisdiction was preserved. Presiding Judge William Walls later noted:
" In his opinion, Judge Walls explained, "There, the government's reliance on secret evidence violares rhe due process protecdons that the Constitution directs must be <:A-tended to
all persons within rhe United Stares, citizens and resident aliens alike. The INS procedures
patently failed the lvlatbews tesr of constitutional sufficiency. And the coun finds this failure
to be sufficient basis to grant the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and direct his release from
cusrody" (WiUiam Walls, United Stares District Judge, Hany Mahmoud Kia~/Mm v. ]an~t
Reno and Immigmtion and Nammlization Service).
"Sentelle, Circuit Judge: "Two organizations, the National Council of Resistance of Iran
and the People's Mojahedin of Iran, petition for review of the Secretary's designation of rbe
rwo as constituting a 'foreign terrorist organizarion' under the Anti-Terrorism and .Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, raising both statutory and constitutional arguments. While we determine char rhe designation was in compliance wirh the srature, we further determine rhat
rhe designation does violate the due process rights of the petitioners under the Fifth Amendment, and we therefore remand the case for further proceedings consistent with dtis opinion"
(Natio11ai Council of&sistana ofIran v. D~partmmt ofSrau).

••s u.s.c. 1252(g).
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Its decision avoided the serious constitutional problem which
would surface if it were to conclude that IIRIRA revoked habeas
jurisdiction as well as review under the Administrative Procedures
Act: The Court observed that the Suspension Clause of rhe Constitution would be violated if scawtory provisions such as IIRIRA
were construed to preclude all review of executive detention. 17

The court is subtly responding to the anti-terrorism legislation
by saying that if these statutes truly mean to revoke habeas jurisdiction, then we have a serious constitutional problem. Many would
argue that such individuals are aliens, not citizens; rhus not entitled
to constitutional rights. In response to this argument, Judge Walls
writes, "This argumenr ignores the axiomatic, constitutional premise that aliens, once legally admitted into the United States, are entitled ro the shelter of the Constitution. "' 8 The Constitution clearly
protects aliens who are admitted legally, and therefore, if legislators
did mean to revoke habeas jurisdiction of federal courts (as the
starute states), then we do have a serious constitutional problem.
THE SOLUTION

A recent article in The National Law Journal addresses the issue
of the constitutionality and effectiveness of the recent anti-terrorism
legislation: "The danger that lies ahead for both security and liberty
is that our leaders and police agencies will propose, our legislatures
will adopt and our courts will sanction severe limitations on civil
liberties with no appreciable increase in security." 19 As demonstrated, anti-terrorism legislation has severely infringed upon the
promised civil liberties of the Constitution, but the article raises
another interesting question: even if we, as a people, are willing to
sacrifice our civil liberties, will the legislation actually prevent terrorism? The proposed solution offered by federal law enforcement
'' Walls, KiatY!!dten v. &no and Immigration ant! Naturalization Service, 7·
"Ibid., 11.

"Harvey Silverglare, "Ler's Not Trade Freedom for Security," National Law foumal,
24 September 1001, A26.
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agencies since 1996 has been, " bend the rules and we'll prevent
terrorism ." C learly, September II was a demonstration of how this
approach has failed. Admittedly, we do not kt)ow what planned
terrorist attacks may have been prevented, but we do know that the
m os t terrible attack in history was not. After the confessed intelligence failu re, officials co ntinue co propose the same solution ,
"bend the rules som e more and we'll prevent terrorism. " 20 With increased powers, our federal law enforcement agencies run the risk
of becoming a coercive and oppressive fo rce that answers to no
one. Ir is uncertain whether these measures will provide national
security or create more enemies. A recent article in the journal of
Islamic Law and Culwre scares:
The American body politic needs to awaken to the fact tha t if any
segment of our society can h elp us bridge our severe gaps of credibili ty, understanding, and coopera tion with the over 1 billion
Muslims living in the world today, it is the U.S. Muslim community, well over 5 million strong and a microcosm of that vast ethnic and cultural diversity that comprises the Dar al-Islam. If,
however, we let fear govern the treatm ent of the Muslim community in the U .S ., we will compound the tragedy of September nth
with yet another. 21

We do not need to make American Muslims our enemies; we
need to maintain them as our allies. We are not more secure by refusing "potential terrorists" thei r rights to due process, or res tricting habeas jurisdiction. We are more secure as a nation by adhering to the time-tested rights promised by o ur Constitu tion. As
Judge Walls writes in his opinion on Kia1·eideen v. Reno, "the government's claimed interest [the unarguably weighty one of national
security) in detaining the petitioner cannot be said to outweigh the
petitioner's interest in returning to freedom. " 22

'" Ibid.
:t Alexander, 119.

''Walls, 36-37.
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We do nor need to compromise our constitutional standards in
order to ensure national security. Many new measures are proving
effective safeguards in preventing terrorist acts, such as increased
coordination berween federal agencies and stricter airport security,
but giving federal agencies intelligence and enforcement powers
without being subject to judicial review is a dangerous experiment.
We do not need to change the rules of the game; we need to improve the way we play. The anti-terrorism legislation needs to be
amended and aligned with our constitutional standards. We must
ensure all people, citizens and aliens alike, due process of law and
the right to judicial review of the terms of one's detention. By ensuring these civil liberties and continu ing to increase and improve
our intelligence and security efforts we will ensure the national
security our country desires. If we deny U .S. Muslims their constitutional rights, alienating them with unlawful searches, surveillance, and detention, we run the risk of compounding the terrorist
problem. The solution to our problem is to increase our intelligence
efforts and security methods while protecting the civil liberties of
Americans Muslims so they can become our greatest ally in fighting
the war on terrorism.

